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Abstract
A major goal in Algorithmic Game Theory is to justify equilibrium concepts from an algo-
rithmic and complexity perspective. One appealing approach is to identify natural distributed
algorithms that converge quickly to an equilibrium. This paper established new convergence
results for two generalizations of Proportional Response in Fisher markets with buyers having
CES utility functions. The starting points are respectively a new convex and a new convex-
concave formulation of such markets. The two generalizations correspond to suitable mirror
descent algorithms applied to these formulations. Several of our new results are a consequence
of new notions of strong Bregman convexity and of strong Bregman convex-concave functions,
and associated linear rates of convergence, which may be of independent interest.
Among other results, we analyze a damped generalized Proportional Response and show a
linear rate of convergence in a Fisher market with buyers whose utility functions cover the full
spectrum of CES utilities aside the extremes of linear and Leontief utilities; when these utilities
are included, we obtain an empirical O(1/T ) rate of convergence.
Keywords. Proportional Response, mirror descent, Bregman divergence, Fisher market
1 Introduction
One of the most important results in Algorithmic Game Theory is the PPAD-hardness of finding
a Nash Equilibrium in finite games [19, 8], which serves as a strong evidence that there is no
efficient algorithm to compute Nash Equilibria. Similar hardness results have been established for
markets [15, 7, 10, 49, 9]. By viewing the players and the environment collectively as implicitly
performing a computation, these hardness results indicate that, in general, a market cannot reach
an equilibrium quickly. In Kamal Jain’s words: “If your laptop cannot find it, neither can the
market” [42, Chapter 2.1].
As a result, a lot of attention has been given to the design of polynomial-time algorithms to find
equilibria, either exactly or approximately, for specific families of games and markets. Most of these
algorithms can be categorized as either simplex-like (e.g., Lemke-Howson), numerical methods (e.g.,
the interior-point method or the ellipsoid method), or some carefully-crafted combinatorial algo-
rithm (e.g., flow-based algorithms for computing a market equilibrium for linear utility functions).
∗The work of Richard Cole and Yixin Tao was supported in part by NSF grant CCF-1527568.
1
However, it seems implausible that these algorithms describe the implicit computations in games
or markets. For many markets would appear to have a highly distributed environment, or need to
make rapid decisions on an ongoing basis. These features would appear to preclude computations
which require centralized coordination, which is essential for the three categories of algorithms
above. Consequently, in order to justify equilibrium concepts, we want natural algorithms which
could plausibly be running (in an implicit form) in the associated distributed environments.
This paper will focus on Fisher markets (or economies1). In a Fisher market there are buyers who
start with money which they have no desire to keep, and sellers who have goods to sell, which they
wish to sell in their entirety for money. This is a modest generalization of the notion of Competitive
Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (CEEI) [29, 48]. In prior work on computing equilibria for these
markets, there has been a particular focus on Eisenberg-Gale markets, a term coined by Jain
and Vazirani, and their generalizations [30]; Eisenberg-Gale markets are Fisher markets in which
demands are determined by homothetic utility functions. The latter markets have been seen to
capture the notion of proportional fairness, as defined in the networking community [32], which is
also equivalent to the optimum Nash Social Welfare [37, 31].
Two natural dynamics have been studied in the context of Fisher markets. The first, which is
perhaps the most intuitive candidate for a natural algorithm, is tatonnement, in which the price of
a good is raised if the demand exceeds the supply of the good, and decreased if the demand is too
small. Implicitly, buyers’ demands are assumed to be a best-response to the current prices. This
highly intuitive algorithm was proposed by Walras well over a century ago [50].
Proportional Response, in contrast, is a buyer-oriented update, originally analyzed in an effort
to explain the behavior of peer-to-peer networks [51, 33]. Here, buyers update their spending in
proportion to the contribution each good makes to its current utility. While its meaning is clear
for linear and other separable utilities, for other classes of utilities this needs more interpretation,
which we provide in Section 2. Here prices are assumed to equal the current spending. An O(1/T )
rate of convergence was shown in [2] for Fisher markets with buyers having linear utilities, and
for the substitutes domain excluding linear utilities, a faster linear rate (i.e., exp(−Ω(T )) rate) of
convergence was shown in [52].
This paper continues the exploration of the connection between distributed dynamic processes
and convex optimization, and more specifically the relation of Proportional Response to mirror
descent.
Our first set of results starts by rederiving Zhang’s bounds for CES substitutes utilities, by
showing that for this setting Proportional Response amounts to mirror descent on a suitable convex
function. To achieve the linear rate of convergence he obtained, we need to go beyond the standard
O(1/T ) rate of convergence for mirror descent with a Bregman divergence. We proceed by analogy
with gradient descent. Gradient descent with a Lipschitz constraint on the gradients guarantees
only an O(1/T ) rate of convergence, but a faster linear rate of convergence is obtained when the
objective function f is strongly convex. For mirror descent with Bregman Divergences we introduce
the notion of strong Bregman convexity and show that it also leads to a linear convergence rate.
It turns out that the convex function associated with the CES substitutes utilities satisfies strong
Bregman convexity, thereby obtaining Zhang’s bound anew. In addition, for complementary CES
utilities, the same now concave function satisfies an analogous strong Bregman concavity property,
which also yields a linear rate of convergence for these utilities. In addition, if we include linear
utilities in the substitutes utilities, we obtain an O(1/T ) rate of convergence; likewise, including
Leontief utilities in the complementary utilities also yields an O(1/T ) rate.
1In the CS literature the term market has been widely used to refer to economies; we follow this practice.
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Next, we seek to handle substitute and complementary CES utilities simultaneously. The chal-
lenge we face is that the objective function used for the first set of results becomes a mixed concave-
convex function in this setting, and the equilibrium corresponds to a saddle point of this function.
We introduce the further notion of strongly-Bregman convex-concave functions, and for these func-
tions we obtain a linear rate of convergence to the saddle point. Again, our objective function of
the mixed CES utilities satisfies this property, thereby yielding linear convergence, albeit now for a
Damped Proportional Response, rather than the undamped Proportional Response analyzed in the
first set of results. Here, including linear utilities and Leontief utilities yields an empirical O(1/T )
rate of convergence.
We note that our results are not a straightforward application of the existing mirror descent
toolbox. The Bregman notions and the related convergence results in this paper are new. While
the results for strong Bregman convex (resp. concave) functions are natural generalizations of
gradient descent (resp. ascent) on standard strong convex (resp. concave) functions, the technique
for demonstrating convergence for strong Bregman convex-concave functions appears to be new.
It is not evident that suitable damping (i.e., reducing the step-size) permits a clean convergence
analysis. Indeed, results showing linear point-wise convergence on convex-concave functions are
rare; in fact, the only such work we are aware of is [28]. We believe the new notions and convergence
results for optimization problems may be of wider interest.
Roadmap In Section 2 we give necessary definitions and notation, and in Section 3 we state
our results precisely. Then, in Section 4, we describe related work. In Section 5 we carry out the
analysis of mirror descent when Strong Bregman convexity holds, and then derive the convergence
behavior of Proportional Response in each of the substitutes and complements domains. In Sec-
tion 7, we perform an analogous analysis for strong Bregman convex-concave functions, and deduce
the convergence behavior of a Damped Proportional Response in combined substitutes and com-
plements domains. Finally, in Section 9 we discuss the rates of convergence under some alternate
measures.
2 Notation and Definitions
We use bold symbols, e.g., p,x, e, to denote vectors.
Fisher Market In a Fisher market, there are n perfectly divisible goods and m buyers. Without
loss of generality, the supply of each good j is normalized to be one unit. Each buyer i has a utility
function ui : R
n
+ → R, and a budget of size ei. At any given price vector p ∈ Rn+, each buyer
purchases a maximum utility affordable collection of goods. More precisely, xi ∈ Rn+ is said to be
a demand of buyer i if xi ∈ argmaxx′: x′·p≤ei ui(x′).
A price vector p∗ ∈ Rn+ is called a market equilibrium if at p∗, there exists a demand xi of each
buyer i such that
p∗j > 0 ⇒
m∑
i=1
xij = 1 and p
∗
j = 0 ⇒
m∑
i=1
xij ≤ 1.
The collection of xi is said to be an equilibrium allocation to the buyers.
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CES utilities In this paper, each buyer i’s utility function is of the form
ui(xi) =

 n∑
j=1
aij · (xij)ρi

1/ρi ,
for some −∞ ≤ ρi ≤ 1. ui(xi) is called a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) utility function.
They are a class of utility functions often used in economic analysis. The limit as ρi → −∞ is
called a Leontief utility, usually written as ui(xi) = minj
xij
cij
2; and the limit as ρi → 0 is called
a Cobb-Douglas utility, usually written as
∏
j xij
aij , with
∑
j aij = 1. The utilities with ρi ≥ 0
capture goods that are substitutes, and those with ρi ≤ 0 goods that are complements.
Notation Buyer i’s spending on good j, denoted by bij , is given by bij = xij · pj. Also, zj =∑
i xij − 1 denotes the excess demand for good j. We sometimes index prices, spending, and
demands by t to indicate the relevant value at time t. Finally, we use a superscript of ∗ to indicate
an equilibrium value.
Bregman Divergence and Mirror Descent Let C be a compact and convex set. Given a
differentiable convex function h(x) with domain C, the Bregman divergence generated by kernel h
is denoted by dh, and is defined as:
dh(x,y) = h(x) − [ h(y) + 〈 ∇h(y) , x− y 〉 ] , ∀x ∈ C and y ∈ rint(C),
where rint(C) is the relative interior of C. We note that, in general, dh is asymmetric, i.e., possibly
dh(x,y) 6= dh(y,x). In this paper, we use the Kullback-Leibler or KL divergence extensively; it
is the Bregman divergence generated by h(x) =
∑
j(xj · lnxj − xj). When
∑
j xj =
∑
j yj, the
explicit formula is:
KL(x||y) :=
∑
j
xj · ln xj
yj
.
For the problem of minimizing a convex function f(x) subject to x ∈ C, the mirror descent
method w.r.t. Bregman divergence dh is given by the following update rule:
xt+1 = argmin
x∈C
{
f(xt) +
〈 ∇f(xt) , x− xt 〉 + 1
Γt
· dh(x,xt)
}
, (1)
where Γt > 0, and may be dependent on t.
Proportional Response For linear utility functions, Proportional Response is the dynamic given
by the spending update rule:
bt+1ij = ei ·
aijx
t
ij∑
k aikx
t
ik
= ei ·
aij
btij
ptj∑
k aik
bt
ik
pt
k
with ptk =
∑
i
btik.
2Here, the utility function ui(x) = minj
xij
cij
can be seen as the limit of ui(x) =
(∑
j
(
xij
cij
)ρi ) 1ρi as ρi tends to
−∞.
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For substitutes CES utilities, [52] generalized this rule to:
bt+1ij = ei ·
aij(x
t
ij)
ρi∑
k aik(x
t
ik)
ρi
= ei ·
aij
(
btij
ptj
)ρi
∑
k aik
(
bt
ik
pt
k
)ρi (2)
obtaining a linear convergence rate for the resulting dynamic, assuming 0 < ρi < 1. The above rule
has a natural distributed interpretation in the Fisher market setting: in each round, each buyer
splits her spending on different goods in proportion to the values of aik(x
t
ik)
ρi . The seller of good
j then allocates the good to buyers in proportion to the spending received from each buyer.
3 Results
3.1 Proportional Response
It is natural to seek to extend the Proportional Response rule (2) to the complementary domain,
but this rule does not lead to convergent behavior in general. Set ρ = −1. Suppose there are two
buyers and two items. Both buyers have the same preference for each item and the same budgets;
i.e. a11 = a12 = a21 = a22 =
1
2 , and e1 = e2 = 1. Initially, at time t = 0, suppose that b
(0)
11 =
1
4 ,
b
(0)
12 =
3
4 , b
(0)
21 =
3
4 , and b
(0)
22 =
1
4 . A simple calculation shows that applying update rule (2) gives
b
(1)
11 =
3
4 , b
(1)
12 =
1
4 , b
(1)
21 =
1
4 , and b
(1)
22 =
3
4 . So this simple example shows that in this setting, the
spending will not converge to the market equilibrium; rather, it will cycle among two states.
Instead, we observe that in the substitutes domain, excluding Cobb-Douglas utilities, this rule is
the mirror descent updating rule using the KL divergence for the following optimization problem.
min
b
Φ(b) = −
∑
ij
bij
ρi
log
aij(bij)
ρi−1
(
∑
h bhj)
ρi
subject to
∑
jbij = ei for all i, and bij ≥ 0 for all i, j.
We exclude Cobb-Douglas utilities, because as ρi → 0 the corresponding term in Φ tends to ∞.
When restricted to linear utilities, i.e. ρi = 1 for all i, this is simply Shmyrev’s convex program [46]
for these markets.
In the complementary domain, the mirror descent updating rule for this function is:
bt+1ij = ei ·
(
aij
(ptj)
ρi
) 1
1−ρi
∑
k
(
aik
(pt
k
)ρi
) 1
1−ρi
for −∞ < ρi < 0, and bt+1ij = ei ·
cijp
t
j∑
k cikp
t
k
for ρi = −∞,
where ptk =
∑
ib
t
ik. (3)
Accordingly, we adopt this as the generalization of Proportional Response to the complementary
domain. This rule can be easily implemented in the distributed environment of Fisher markets.
In each round, each buyer only needs the prices computed in the previous round to compute its
update. Thus, to implement the update rule, it suffices to have the sellers broadcast their prices
by the end of each round.
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Interestingly, this update rule is also the best response action to the current prices for each
buyer. We note that this rule can be viewed as a tatonnement update if we define xt+1ij = b
t+1
ij /p
t
j ,
for then pt+1j =
∑
i b
t+1
ij =
∑
i x
t+1
ij p
t
j = p
t
j(1+z
t+1
j ). However, this is not the same rule as was used
for the tatonnement analyzed in recent works regarding Fisher markets [17, 11].
For linear utilities, update rule (2) was analyzed in [2]. For the substitutes domain excluding
linear utilities, a faster linear rate of convergence was shown in [52], but not based on considering
the above optimization problem. To obtain a linear rate of convergence for an analysis based on
optimizing Φ via a mirror descent with a KL Divergence, we introduce the notion of strong Bregman
convexity. We also coin the term Bregman convexity for an analogous notion introduced in [2]).
Definition 1. The function f is L-Bregman convex w.r.t. Bregman divergence dh if, for any y ∈
rint(C) and x ∈ C,
f(y) + 〈 ∇f(y) , x− y 〉 ≤ f(x) ≤ f(y) + 〈 ∇f(y) , x− y 〉 + L · dh(x,y).
The function f is (σ,L)-strongly Bregman convex w.r.t. Bregman divergence dh if, 0 < σ ≤ L, and,
for any y ∈ rint(C), x ∈ C,
f(y)+ 〈 ∇f(y) , x− y 〉 + σ · dh(x,y) ≤ f(x) ≤ f(y)+ 〈 ∇f(y) , x− y 〉 + L · dh(x,y).
If the direction of the inequalities and the signs on the dh(x,y) terms are reversed, the function
is said to be Bregman concave (or strongly Bregman concave respectively). (rint(C) denotes the
relative interior of C.)
Consider the update rule:
xt+1 ← argmin
y
{〈 ∇f(xt) , y − xt 〉 + L · dh(y,xt)} . (4)
Theorem 3.1. Suppose that f is (σ,L)-strongly Bregman convex w.r.t. dh. If update rule (4) is
applied, then, for all t ≥ 1,
f(xt)− f(x∗) ≤ σ(
L
L−σ
)t
− 1
· dh(x∗,x0).
An analogous Theorem for L-Bregman convex functions was given in [2]:
Theorem 3.2. [2] Suppose f is an L-Bregman convex function w.r.t. d, and xT is the point reached
after T applications of the mirror descent update rule (4). Then,
f(xT )− f(x∗) ≤ L · d(x
∗,x0)
T
.
We show that in the CES substitutes domain, excluding linear utilities, Φ is a strongly Bregman
convex function w.r.t. the KL-divergence on spending, thereby providing an alternative derivation
of Zhang’s result. In addition, in the CES complements domain, excluding Leontief utilities, Φ is
a strongly Bregman concave function w.r.t. the KL divergence on spending, which yields a proof
of linear convergence in this domain. These analyses are readily modified to give a 1/T rate of
convergence if we include respectively the linear and Leontief utilities. These results are made
precise in the following theorem.
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Theorem 3.3. Suppose buyers with substitutes utilities repeatedly update their spending using
Proportional Response rule (2), and those with complementary utilities use rule (3). Then the
potential function Φ converges to the market equilibrium as follows.
• If all buyers have substitutes CES utilities, then
Φ(bT )− Φ(b∗) ≤ 1
T
∑
i
1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||b0i ).
• Suppose that in addition no buyer has a linear utility. Let σ = mini{1− ρi}. Then,
Φ(bT )− Φ(b∗) ≤ σ(1 − σ)
T
1− (1− σ)T
∑
i
1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||b0i ).
• If all buyers have complementary CES utilities, then3
Φ(b∗)− Φ(bT ) ≤ 1
T
∑
i
ρi − 1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||b0i ).
• Suppose that in addition no buyer has a Leontief utility. Let σ = mini
{
1
1−ρi
}
. Then,
Φ(b∗)− Φ(bT ) ≤ σ(1− σ)
T
1− (1− σ)T
∑
i
ρi − 1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||b0i ).
The results are shown in Corollaries 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4, respectively. We also note that as
shown in Lemma 13 in [2], if bij = ei/m for all i and j, then KL(b
∗||b) ≤ logmn, which provides
a possibly more intuitive version of the above bounds.
Theorem 3.3 does not cover buyers with Cobb-Douglas utilities, because, as already noted, the
terms in Φ for such buyers are equal to ∞. Note that these buyers always wish to allocate their
spending in fixed proportions regardless of the prices. Thus, arguably, it would be natural for these
buyers to always have the equilibrium spending. But even if this were not true initially, after one
update this property would hold, and remain true henceforth. Thus the presence of these buyers
would seem to have little effect on the convergence. Indeed, the above bounds hold with KL(b∗i ||b0i )
replaced by KL(b∗i ||b1i ) and T replaced by T − 1 on the RHS. But to obtain bounds in terms of
KL(b∗i ||b0i ) appears to require substantially more effort; this analysis is given in Appendix A(see
Theorems A.1–A.4). The rates of convergence are similar to those given in Theorem 3.3.
3.2 Damped Proportional Response
But what if we want to allow a mix of substitutes and complementary utilities? The difficulty we
face is that the objective function Φ is no longer either convex or concave. Rather, if we fix the
spending of the buyers with complementary utilities, the resulting restricted Φ is convex, while if
we fix the spending of the buyers with substitutes utilities, the resulting restricted Φ is concave.
As it happens, the equilibrium corresponds to a saddle point of the function Φ. Also, a suitable
dynamic will converge to this saddle point. To show this, we introduce a saddle-point convergence
analysis. To this end, we define the following notion.
3For ρi = −∞, we define
ρi−1
ρi
to equal 1.
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Definition 2. Function f is (LX , LY )-convex-concave w.r.t. the pair of Bregman divergences
(dg, dh), if it satisfies the following constraints.
1. For fixed y, f(·,y) is a convex function;
2. For fixed x, f(x, ·) is a concave function;
3. There exist parameters LX , LY > 0 such that for any x ∈ X, x′ ∈ X, y ∈ Y and y′ ∈ Y ,
−LY · dh(y,y′)
(a)
≤ f(x,y)− f(x′,y′)− 〈∇f(x′,y′), (x,y) − (x′,y′)〉
(b)
≤ LX · dg(x,x′). (5)
The saddle point is the “optimal” point of the convex-concave function, which is the minimum
point in the x-direction and the maximum point in the y-direction, defined formally as follows.
Definition 3. (x∗, y∗) is a saddle point of f if and only if
f(x, y∗) ≥ f(x∗, y∗) ≥ f(x∗, y) for any x ∈ X and y ∈ Y .
Now consider the following update rule:
xt+1 = argmin
x
{〈∇xf(xt,yt),x− xt〉+ 2LX · dg(x,xt)};
yt+1 = argmin
y
{〈−∇yf(xt,yt),y − yt〉+ 2LY · dh(y,yt)}. (6)
We can then show an O(1/T ) empirical rate of convergence, as stated in the next theorem.
Theorem 3.4. Suppose that f is (LX , LY )-convex-concave, and there exists a saddle point (x
∗,y∗).
In addition, suppose that (x,y) is updated according to (6). Then:
(i)
T∑
t=1
(
f(xt,y∗)− f(x∗,yt)
)
≤ 2LX · dg(x∗,x0) + 2LY · dh(y∗,y0).
Note that f(xt,y∗)− f(x∗,yt) ≥ 0 since f(xt,y∗) ≥ f(x∗,y∗) ≥ f(x∗,yt).
(ii) Also, if x¯ = 1T
∑T
t=1 x
t and y¯ = 1T
∑T
t=1 y
t, then:
f(x¯,y∗)− f(x∗, y¯) ≤ 1
T
[2LX · dg(x∗,x0) + 2LY · dh(y∗,y0)].
Note that the second part of the theorem follows immediately from the first part because f(·,y∗)
is a convex function and f(x∗, ·) is a concave function.
The objective function Φ is (1, 1)-convex-concave w.r.t. dg =
∑
i:ρi>0
1
ρi
KL(bi||b′i) and dh =∑
i:∞<ρi<0
ρi−1
ρi
KL(bi||b′i) +
∑
i:ρi=−∞
KL(bi||b′i). Consequently, we obtain an empirical O(1/T )
rate of convergence for the following Damped Proportional Response update.
bt+1ij = ei ·
[
btij · aij
(
btij
ptj
)ρi] 12
∑
k
[
btik · aik
(
bt
ik
pt
k
)ρi] 12 , for ρi > 0; bt+1ij = ei ·
[
btij ·
(
aij
(ptj)
ρi
) 1
1−ρi
] 1
2
∑
k
[
btik ·
(
aik
(pt
k
)ρi
) 1
1−ρi
] 1
2
, for −∞ < ρi < 0;
bt+1ij = ei ·
[
btij ·
(
cij
ptj
)−1] 1
2
∑
k
[
btik ·
(
cik
pt
k
)−1] 1
2
, for ρi = −∞; (7)
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We say it is damped because the update rule uses the geometric mean of the current value and the
standard Proportional Response update.
A natural question is whether a linear convergence rate is possible if the linear and Leontief
utilities are excluded. The answer is yes, and to obtain this we need a stronger condition on the
convex-concave objective function, as given in the following definition.
Definition 4. f is a (σX , σY , LX , LY )-strongly Bregman convex-concave function, w.r.t. Bregman
divergences dg, dh, if, for all x ∈ X, x′ ∈ X, y ∈ Y , and y′ ∈ Y , function f satisfies:
− LY · dh(y,y′) + σX · dg(x,x′) ≤ f(x,y)− f(x′,y′)− 〈∇f(x′,y′), (x,y) − (x′,y′)〉
≤ LX · dg(x,x′)− σY · dh(y,y′). (8)
Theorem 3.5. If f is a (σX , σY , LX , LY )-strongly Bregman convex-concave function w.r.t dg and
dh, and there exists a saddle point, then update rule (6) converges to the saddle point with a linear
convergence rate:
(
f(xT ,y∗)− f(x∗,yT )
)
≤
(
1−
min
{
σX
LX
, σYLY
}
2
)T−1(
(2LX − σX)dg(x∗,x0) + (2LY − σY )dh(y∗,y0)
)
.
Φ is (mini:ρi>0{1 − ρi},mini:ρi<0
{
1
1−ρi
}
, 1, 1)-strongly Bregman convex-concave, and thus we
can deduce that the Damped Proportional Response achieves a linear convergence rate if linear and
Leontief utilities are excluded.
As before, the above results exclude Cobb-Douglas utilities.
Arguably, the buyers with Cobb-Douglas utilities should always have the equilibrium spending,
or failing that, should immediately update to this spending. But for mathematical consistency, we
suppose they are performing the same type of damped update as the other buyers. In this case,
our previous potential function can’t be used when we include Cobb-Douglas utility functions. We
now need to include a term in the potential function for each buyer with a Cobb-Douglas utility as
their spending keeps changing.
We will need the following notation. Let b>0, b=0, and b<0 denote the spending of those buyers
with ρi > 0, ρi = 0, and ρi < 0, respectively. Accordingly, we will write Φ(b) = Φ(b>0,b=0,b<0).
The resulting function is still convex in b>0 and concave in b<0. The construction is given in
Appendix A.1. We note that the update rule for the buyers with ρi = 0 is given by:
bt+1ij = ei ·
[
btij · atij
] 1
2
∑
k
[
btik · atik
] 1
2
, for ρi = 0.
Theorem 3.6. Suppose buyers repeatedly update their spending using the Damped Proportional
Response rule (7). Then
KL(bT=0||b∗=0) ≤
1
2T
KL(b0=0||b∗=0),
and the potential function Φ converges to the market equilibrium as follows:
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i.
T∑
t=1
[
Φ(bt>0,b
∗
=0,b
∗
<0)− Φ(b∗>0,b∗=0,bt<0)
]
≤ 4
∑
i:ρi=0
KL(b∗i ||b0i ) +
∑
i:−∞<ρi<0
2(ρi − 1)
ρi
KL(b∗i ||b0i ) +
∑
i:ρi>0
2
ρi
KL(b∗i ||b0i ) +
∑
i:ρi=−∞
KL(b∗i ||b0i ).
ii. If in addition no buyer has a linear or Leontief utility,
Let σ = min
{
min
i:ρi>0
{
2
1 + ρi
}
, min
i:ρi<0
{
2(ρi − 1)
2ρi − 1
} }
(so 1 < σ < 2). Then,
Φ(bT>0,b
∗
=0,b
∗
<0)−Φ(b∗>0,b∗=0,bT<0) ≤
1
σT−1
[
4
2− σ
∑
i:ρi=0
KL(b∗i ||b0i )
+
∑
i:ρi<0
2ρi − 1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||b0i ) +
∑
i:ρi>0
1 + ρi
ρi
KL(b∗i ||b0i )
]
.
Weaker bounds are shown in Corollaries 8.1 and 8.2, respectively. The complete proof is given
in Appendix A (see Theorems A.5 and A.6).
4 Related Work
The concept of a market equilibrium was first proposed by Walras [50] along with a description of
the tatonnement process. Since then, studies of market equilibria and tatonnement have received
much attention in economics, operations research, and most recently in computer science. A fairly
recent account of the classic perspective in economics is given in [36].
Computer scientists, beginning with the work by Deng et al. [21], showed that computing equi-
libria was a hard problem in general; see also [20, 43]. This led to much work on polynomial time
algorithms for restricted classes of markets, e.g. [23, 22, 14, 27].
The Eisenberg-Gale program for the case of linear utilities was formulated in [26] and then gen-
eralized to homothetic functions in [25]; further generalizations were given in [30]. The maxima
of these convex programs correspond to the equilibria of the corresponding markets. In partic-
ular, when buyer or agent utilities are homothetic, the optimum of the Eisenberg-Gale program
corresponds to the optimum Nash Social Welfare; interestingly, this optimum also appears to pro-
vide good outcomes when apportioning indivisible goods [4, 5]. Recently, Cole et al. [16] identified
another variant of the Eisenberg-Gale program that captured the best currently-known polynomial-
time approximate solution for the indivisible setting.
The analysis most similar to ours is the one in [2] which considers convex functions that obey
a constraint which we name L-Bregman convexity w.r.t. a Bregman divergence (see Definition 1).
Our work generalizes this notion substantially.
The earliest analyses of tatonnement showed convergence in exchange economies with gross
substitutes utilities, first for continuous updating [1] and then for discrete updates [47], but it was
shown to diverge in general [45]. Recent works have analyzed its convergence properties in specific
markets, primarily Fisher markets [17, 12, 11]. Cheung et al. [11] showed that tatonnement is
equivalent to coordinate descent on a convex function for several classes of Fisher markets, and
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consequently that a suitable tatonnement converges toward the market equilibrium in two classes
of markets: complementary-CES Fisher markets and Leontief Fisher markets.
Other dynamics have been considered. In particular, Dvijotham et al. [24] study sellers best
responding in a setting in which they form beliefs about other sellers’ strategies. They obtain
linear convergence in Fisher markets for most of the CES domain, but not for linear utilities. In
the context of network flow control, Low and Lapsley [34] adopted an optimization approach to
derive a dynamic protocol where both prices (of links) and flow demands of agents are updated,
and showed that the protocol converges to a social-welfare maximizing state. The update rules
(2), (3) look quite similar to a game-learning dynamic called log-linear learning [3, 35] (by suitably
viewing spendings as probability densities), but due to different contexts (games vs. markets), the
actual behaviors and the analyses have significant qualitative differences.
Convex-concave saddle-point problems can be reduced to non-smooth convex minimization prob-
lems, for which algorithms yielding O(1/
√
T ) convergence rate exist. Its wide applications (e.g., to
two-person zero-sum game equilibria) have motivated exploration of properties of the underlying
function which support faster converging algorithms [38, 40, 39, 41, 44]. In this paper, we present
a new property and a simple algorithm which yields an O(1/T ) empirical convergence rate. In our
opinion, its analysis is quite simple, which may well open the door to further exploration. Indeed,
we have taken such a step by presenting a variant of our new property for which the same algorithm
yields a linear point-wise convergence rate.
5 Linear Convergence with Strong Bregman Convexity
Our proof will use the following lemmas.
Lemma 5.1. [6] If x+ is the optimal point for the optimization problem:
minimize g(x) + d(x,y)
subject to x ∈ C,
where C is a compact convex set, then, for any x ∈ C,
g(x+) + d(x+,y) + d(x,x+) ≤ g(x) + d(x,y).
Lemma 5.2. [2] Suppose that f is an L-Bregman convex function w.r.t. d(x,x′), and xt and xt+1
are the points reached after t and t+ 1 applications of the mirror descent update rule (4). Then
f(xt+1) ≤ f(xt).
Proof of Theorem 3.1. By Lemma 5.1 with y = xt, x+ = xt+1, and x = x∗,〈 ∇f(xt) , xt+1 − xt 〉 + L · dh(xt+1,xt) ≤ 〈 ∇f(xt) , x∗ − xt 〉 + L · [dh(x∗,xt)− dh(x∗,xt+1)] .
(9)
By strong Bregman-convexity, with y = xt, and x = xt+1,〈 ∇f(xt) , xt+1 − xt 〉 + L · dh(xt+1,xt) ≥ f(xt+1)− f(xt); (10)
and with y = xt and x = x∗,
∇f(xt) · (x∗ − xt) ≤ f(x∗)− f(xt)− σ · dh(x∗,xt). (11)
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Combining (9), (10), and (11), gives, for t ≥ 0,
f(xt+1)− f(x∗) ≤ (L− σ) · dh(x∗,xt) − L · dh(x∗,xt+1). (12)
On multiplying both sides of the above inequality by
(
L
L−σ
)t
, and then summing over 0 ≤ t < T ,
the RHS becomes a telescoping sum, and hence
T−1∑
t=0
(
L
L− σ
)t
· [f(xt+1)− f(x∗)] ≤ (L− σ) · dh(x∗,x0).
By Lemma 5.2, f(xt+1) ≤ f(xt); thus:
L− σ
σ
·
[(
L
L− σ
)T
− 1
]
·[f(xT )− f(x∗)] =
(
T−1∑
t=0
(
L
L− σ
)t)
·[f(xT )− f(x∗)] ≤ (L−σ)·dh(x∗,x0),
and the result follows.
6 Convergence of Proportional Response
We consider the following potential function:
pj(b) =
∑
ibij,
Φ(b) = −
∑
i:ρi 6={0,−∞}
1
ρi
∑
j
bij log
aijb
ρi−1
ij
[pj(b)]ρi
−
∑
i:ρi=−∞
∑
j
bij log
bij
cijpj(b)
.
For those i for which ρi 6= −∞,
∇bijΦ(b) = −
1
ρi
log aij − ρi − 1
ρi
(log bij + 1) + log pj(b) +
∑
h
bhj
1
pj(b)
=
1
ρi
(
1− log aijb
ρi−1
ij
pρij (b)
)
;
and for those i for which ρi = −∞, ∇bijΦ(b) = − log
bij
cijpj
.
We deduce:
Lemma 6.1.∑
i:ρi 6=−∞
1− ρi
ρi
KL(bi||b′i)−
∑
i:ρi=−∞
KL(bi||b′i) ≤ Φ(b)− Φ(b′)− 〈∇Φ(b′),b− b′〉 ≤
∑
i:ρi 6=−∞
1
ρi
KL(bi||b′i).
Proof.
Φ(b)− Φ(b′)− 〈∇Φ(b′),b− b′〉 = −
∑
i:ρi 6={0,−∞}
ρi − 1
ρi
KL(bi||b′i)−
∑
i:ρi=−∞
KL(bi||b′i) + KL(p||p′)
=
∑
i:ρi 6=−∞
1
ρi
KL(bi||b′i)−
(∑
i
KL(bi||b′i)−KL(p||p′)
)
.
Since
∑
iKL(bi||b′i) ≥ KL(p||p′), the result follows.
12
The Substitutes Domain The following lemma states the equivalence between mirror descent
and Proportional Response in the substitutes domain; it follow readily from the definition of bt+1
for Proportional Response (given by (2)).
Lemma 6.2. For buyers with CES substitutes utilities, the Proportional Response update is the
same as the mirror descent update, given by:
bt+1i = argminbi:
∑
j bij=ei
{
〈∇biΦ(bt),bi − bti〉+
1
ρi
KL(bi||bti)
}
.
The next lemma states several properties of the potential function in the substitutes domain.
Lemma 6.3. i. If ρi > 0 for all i, then Φ is a 1-Bregman convex function w.r.t.
∑
i
1
ρi
KL(bi||b′i);
ii. if 0 < ρi < 1 for all i, then Φ is a (mini{1 − ρi}, 1)-strong Bregman convex function w.r.t.∑
i
1
ρi
KL(bi||b′i);
iii. b is the spending at the market equilibrium if and only if b is the minimum point of Φ.
Proof. The first two claims follow from Lemma 6.1 with a little calculation. The proof of the third
claim is given in Appendix C.
Let b∗ be the spending at some market equilibrium. Applying Theorem 3.2 yields:
Corollary 6.1.
Φ(bT )− Φ(b∗) ≤ 1
T
∑
i
1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||b0i ).
Furthermore, if there is no buyer with a linear utility function, then, applying Theorem 3.1
yields:
Corollary 6.2. Let σ = mini{1− ρi} > 0. Then
Φ(bT )− Φ(b∗) ≤ σ(1− σ)
T
1− (1 − σ)T
∑
i
1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||b0i ).
We now explain how to recover Zhang’s bound [52]. From (12),
∑
i
1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bti) ≤
L− σ
L
∑
i
1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bt−1i ) ≤
(
L− σ
L
)t∑
i
1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||b0i ) =
(
max
i
ρi
)t∑
i
1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||b0i ).
In [52], φ(t) is used to denote
∑
i
1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bti). We have obtained the exact same bound on∑
i
1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bti) as in [52], and thus can deduce the identical convergence rate.
The Complementary Domain We proceed as in the substitutes domain. First, the following
lemma shows the equivalence between the mirror descent and the Proportional Response (given by
(3)) in the complementary domain.
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Lemma 6.4. For those complementary buyers such that −∞ < ρi < 0, the Proportional Response
update, which is the best response in this domain, is equal to the mirror descent update, given by:
bt+1i = argminbi:
∑
j bij=ei
{
−〈∇biΦ(bt),bi − bti〉+
ρi − 1
ρi
KL(bi||bti)
}
;
and this also holds for buyers with Leontief utility functions, where now the mirror descent update
is given by:
bt+1i = argminbi:
∑
j bij=ei
{−〈∇biΦ(bt),bi − bti〉+KL(bi||bti)};
Next, we show the following properties of the potential function in the complementary domain.
The main difference between the complementary case and the substitutes case is that the potential
function is a concave function in the complementary domain, while it is a convex function in the
substitutes domain.
Lemma 6.5. i. If ρi < 0 for all i, then Φ is a 1-Bregman concave function w.r.t.
∑
i
ρi−1
ρi
KL(bi||b′i);
ii. if −∞ < ρi < 0 for all i, then Φ is a (mini{ 11−ρi }, 1)-strong Bregman concave function w.r.t.∑
i
ρi−1
ρi
KL(bi||b′i);
iii. b is the spending at the market equilibrium if and only if b is the maximum point of Φ.
Proof. The first two claims follow from Lemma 6.1 with a little calculation. The proof of the third
claim is given in Appendix C.
Also, let b∗ be the spending at some market equilibrium. Applying Theorem 3.2 yields:4
Corollary 6.3.
Φ(b∗)− Φ(bT ) ≤ 1
T
∑
i
ρi − 1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||b0i ).
In addition, if there is no buyer with a Leontief utility, applying Theorem 3.1 yields:
Corollary 6.4. Let σ = mini{ 11−ρi }. Then,
Φ(b∗)− Φ(bT ) ≤ σ(1 − σ)
T
1− (1− σ)T
∑
i
ρi − 1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||b0i ).
7 Saddle Point Analysis
Proof of Theorem 3.4. Recall that xt+1 = argminx∈X{〈∇xf(xt,yt),x− xt〉+ 2LXdg(x,xt)}. Ap-
plying Lemma 5.1 with x = x∗, d(·, ·) = 2LXdg(·, ·), y = xt, x+ = xt+1, and g(x) = 〈∇xf(xt,yt)〉,x−
xt〉 gives
〈∇xf(xt,yt),xt+1 − xt〉+ 2LXdg(xt+1,xt) ≤ 〈∇xf(xt,yt),x∗ − xt〉+ 2LXdg(x∗,xt)− 2LXdg(x∗,xt+1).
4Recall that for ρi = −∞, we defined (ρi − 1)/ρi = 1.
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This is equivalent to
f(xt,yt) + 〈∇f(xt,yt), (xt+1,yt+1)− (xt,yt)〉+ 2LXdg(xt+1,xt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
LHS
≤ f(xt,yt) + 〈∇f(xt,yt), (x∗,yt+1)− (xt,yt)〉+ 2LXdg(x∗,xt)− 2LXdg(x∗,xt+1).︸ ︷︷ ︸
RHS
(13)
Since f is (LX , Ly)-convex-concave, the third property — see (5) — gives:
f(xt+1,yt+1) + LXdg(x
t+1,xt)
(1)
≤ LHS ≤ RHS
(2)
≤ f(x∗,yt+1) + LY dh(yt+1,yt) + 2LXdg(x∗,xt)− 2LXdg(x∗,xt+1), (14)
where (1) is deduced from (b) in Definition 2 with (x′, y′) = (xt,yt) and (2) is deduced from (a) in
Definition 2 with (x′, y′) = (xt,yt) and (x, y) = (x∗,yt+1).
Now, let’s consider −f(x, y) and yt+1 = argminy∈Y {〈−∇yf(xt,yt),y − yt〉 + 2LY dh(y,yt)}.
Using a similar argument, we obtain:
−f(xt+1,yt+1) + LY dh(yt+1,yt) ≤ −f(xt+1,y∗) + LXdg(xt+1,xt) + 2LY dh(y∗,yt)− 2LY dh(y∗,yt+1).
(15)
Adding these two inequalities gives:
f(xt+1,y∗)− f(x∗,yt+1) ≤ 2LXdg(x∗,xt) + 2LY dh(y∗,yt)− 2LXdg(x∗,xt+1)− 2LY dh(y∗,yt+1).
Summing over t yields:
∑T
t=1
(
f(xt,y∗)− f(x∗,yt)
)
≤ 2LXdg(x∗,x0) + 2LY dh(y∗,y0).
Proof of Theorem 3.5. Using (8) instead of (5), we deduce the following from (13) instead of (14):
f(xt+1,yt+1) + LXdg(x
t+1,xt) ≤ f(x∗,yt+1) + LY dh(yt+1,yt) + (2LX − σX)dg(x∗,xt)− 2LXdg(x∗,xt+1).
Also, (15) is replaced by:
−f(xt+1,yt+1) + LY dh(yt+1,yt) ≤ −f(xt+1,y∗) + LXdg(xt+1,xt) + (2LY − σY )dh(y∗,yt)− 2LY dh(y∗,yt+1).
Summing up these two inequalities gives:
f(xt+1,y∗)− f(x∗,yt+1)
≤ (2LX − σX)dg(x∗,xt) + (2LY − σY )dh(y∗,yt)− 2LXdg(x∗,xt+1)− 2LY dh(y∗,yt+1).
Let σ = min
{
σX
LX
, σYLY
}
. Then:
T−1∑
t=0
(
2
2− σ
)t (
f(xt+1,y∗)− f(x∗,yt+1)
)
≤ (2LX − σX)dg(x∗,x0) + (2LY − σY )dh(y∗,y0).
Note that f(xt,y∗)− f(x∗,yt) is positive for each t, so the result follows.
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8 Analysis of Damped Proportional Response
Excluding Cobb-Douglas Utility Functions First, we consider a simplified situation where
there is no buyer with a Cobb-Douglas utility function. We want to use the technique developed
in the saddle point analysis to obtain a convergence result. The potential function is the same as
before.
We make the following observations.
Lemma 8.1. If ρi > 0 for buyer i, then the Damped Proportional Response (given by (7)) is
equivalent to mirror descent with a halved step size, defined as follows:
bt+1i = argminbi:
∑
j bij=ei
{
〈∇biΦ(bt),bi − bti〉+
2
ρi
KL(bi||bti)
}
;
if −∞ < ρi < 0 for buyer i, then the Damped Proportional Response (given by (7)) is equivalent
to mirror descent (really ascent as this is a concave function) with a halved step size defined as
follows:
bt+1i = argminbi:
∑
j bij=ei
{
−〈∇biΦ(bt),bi − bti〉+
2(ρi − 1)
ρi
KL(bi||bti)
}
;
and if ρi = −∞ for buyer i, then the Damped Proportional Response (given by (7)) is equivalent
to mirror descent (really ascent as this is a concave function) with a halved step sizem defined as
follows:
bt+1i = argminbi:
∑
j bij=ei
{−〈∇biΦ(bt),bi − bti〉+ 2KL(bi||bti)}.
Proof. By calculation.
By Lemma 6.1 and with a simple calculation one can show that, in Definition 2, if we set
x = b>0, y = b<0, dg(x) =
∑
i:ρi>0
1
ρi
KL(bi||b′i), and dh(y) =
∑
i:∞<ρi<0
ρi−1
ρi
KL(bi||b′i) +∑
i:ρi=−∞
KL(bi||b′i) , then Φ is (1, 1)-convex-concave function.
Furthermore, let b∗>0 and b
∗
<0 be the market equilibrium of the Fisher market. Then,
b∗>0 minimizes Φ(·,b∗<0), and b∗<0 maximizes Φ(b∗>0, ·),
which implies (b∗>0,b
∗
<0) is a saddle point of the potential function Φ. Theorem 3.4 yields the
following corollary.
Corollary 8.1. The Damped Proportional Response (given by (7)) converges to an equilibrium
with a convergence rate of:
T∑
t=1
[
Φ(bt>0,b
∗
<0)− Φ(b∗>0,bt<0)
]
≤
∑
i:−∞<ρi<0
2(ρi − 1)
ρi
KL(b∗i ||b0i ) +
∑
i:ρi>0
2
ρi
KL(b∗i ||b0i ) +
∑
i:ρi=−∞
2KL(b∗i ||b0i ).
Moreover, if we assume there is no buyer with either a linear utility of a Leontief utility func-
tion, then, by Lemma 6.1, Ψ(·, ·) is a (mini:ρi>0{1 − ρi},mini:ρi<0{ 11−ρi }, 1, 1)-strong Bregman
convex-concave function with x = b>0, y = b<0, dg(x) =
∑
i:ρi>0
1
ρi
KL(bi||b′i) and dh(y) =∑
i:∞<ρi<0
ρi−1
ρi
KL(bi||b′i) (see Definition 4). Theorem 3.5 yields the following corollary.
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Corollary 8.2. Suppose there is no buyer with either a linear utility or a Leontief utility. Let
σ>0 = min
i:ρi>0
{1− ρi} and σ<0 = min
i:ρi<0
{
1
1− ρi
}
.
Then the Damped Proportional Response (given by (7)) converges to the equilibrium with a conver-
gence rate of
Φ(bT>0,b
∗
<0)−Φ(b∗>0,bT<0)
≤
(
1− min{σ>0, σ<0}
2
)T−1[ ∑
i:ρi<0
(2− σ<0)ρi − 1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||b0i ) +
∑
i:ρi>0
(2− σ>0) 1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||b0i )
]
.
The Entire CES Range Now we consider the Damped Proportional Response with a damping
factor of 2 over the entire CES range, i.e. including Cobb-Douglas utilities. Recall that we modify
our potential function to include terms for the buyers with ρi = 0. However, for this new modified
function, the buyers with Cobb-Douglas utility functions don’t actually perform mirror descent.
Fortunately, we can make two observations.
First, the buyers with Cobb-Douglas utility functions converge quickly to the equilibrium inde-
pendently of everyone else’s spending. Second, the buyers whose utility functions are not Cobb-
Douglas will still perform the mirror descent (ascent) procedure.
So, intuitively, in our analysis, we regard the spending of the buyers with Cobb-Douglas utility
functions as a parameter, θ, of fθ(x,y), where x represents the spending of the strictly substitutes
buyers and y represents the spending of the strictly complementary buyers. Remember, in the
case with no Cobb-Douglas utilities, the market equilibrium corresponded to a saddle point. Here,
similarly, a market equilibrium corresponds to a saddle point of fθ∗(·, ·), where θ∗ is the spending at
the market equilibrium of those buyers with Cobb-Douglas utility functions. We prove the following
two claims.
1. θ converges to θ∗ quickly;
2. when θ tends to θ∗, though x and y perform the mirror descent based on the gradient of
fθ(x,y) and not of fθ∗(x,y), (x,y) will still converge quickly to (x
∗,y∗), the saddle point of
fθ∗(·, ·).
We thereby show that Damped Proportional Response converges to the market equilibrium even
when faced with the entire range of CES utilities.
9 Other Measures of Convergence
The potential function φ appears to be closely related to the Eisenberg-Gale program. In particular,
we can show that in the substitutes domain, when applying update rule (2), the Proportional
Response update, the objective function Ψ for the Eisenberg-Gale program converges at least as
fast as Φ, i.e. that Ψ(x(b∗>0,b
∗
=0))−Ψ(x(b>0,b∗=0)) ≤ Φ(b>0,b∗=0)−Φ(b∗>0,b∗=0), and that in the
complementary domain, when applying update rule (3), the objective function for the dual of the
Eisenberg-Gale program converges at least as fast as Φ. These claims are shown in Appendix B.
Lemma 6.1 allows us to make some observations about the rate of convergence of the spend-
ing. For update rule (2), in the substitutes domain excluding linear utilities, we can deduce that
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∑
iKL(bi||b∗i ) ≤ maxi ρi1−ρi [Φ(b) − Φ(b∗)], and for update rule (3) in the complementary domain
excluding Leontief utilities, that
∑
iKL(bi||b∗i ) ≤ maxi−ρi[Φ(b)−Φ(b∗)]. As the equilibrium need
not be unique in terms of spending for either linear or Leontief utilities, this lemma is not going to
yield a bound on the convergence rate of the spending in these cases, as it can be applied to any
equilibrium. Similarly in the combined domain, still excluding linear and Leontief utilities, we can
observe that∑
i:ρi>0
1− ρi
ρi
KL(bi||b∗i ) +
∑
i:ρi<0
−1
ρi
KL(bi||b∗i ) ≤ [Φ(b>0,b∗<0)− Φ(b∗)] + [Φ(b∗)− Φ(b∗>0,b<0)].
In addition, since KL(p||p∗) ≤ KL(b||b∗) we can immediately obtain analogous bounds on the
KL divergence of the prices. Furthermore, for the substitutes domain, including linear utilities,
Lemma 6.1 also implies that KL(p||p∗) ≤ [Φ(b)− Φ(b∗)].
10 Open Problems
It would be interesting to understand what happens when asynchronous updating is allowed, i.e.
each buyers makes its updates at times independent of the other updates, though with some notion
of bounded asynchrony. However, at present, to the best of our knowledge, there are no techniques
for analyzing asynchronous forms of mirror descent, which makes this a substantial challenge.
Indeed, whether even convergence occurs, let alone fast convergence, is not clear-cut.
Another open problem concerns Proportional Response in more general Arrow-Debreu markets.
Wu and Zhang [51] gave an analysis for the substitute domain in which each agent i is endowed
one unit of good i; they imposed two restrictions on the utility functions of the agents: first,
each agent has the same positive ρ-parameter, and second, the coefficients in the agents’ utility
functions satisfy: aij > 0 if and only if aji > 0 (see their Theorem 4.1). In contrast, market
equilibria are known to exist in more general situations, and admit a convex formulation for the
case mini ρi > −1 [13]. It would be interesting to understand the behavior of Proportional Response
(or its variants) if the restrictions imposed by Wu and Zhang are removed.
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A Proportional Response Including Cobb-Douglas Utilities
A.1 The Potential Function and its Properties
The new potential function, Φ(b), which includes buyers with Cobb-Douglas utilities, is defined as
follows:
pj(b) =
∑
i
bij ,
Φ(b) = −
∑
i:ρi 6={0,−∞}
1
ρi
∑
j
bij log
aijb
ρi−1
ij
[pj(b)]ρi
−
∑
i:ρi=−∞
∑
j
bij log
bij
cijpj(b)
+
∑
i:ρi=0
∑
j
bij log pj(b).
Note that for those i for which ρi 6= {0,−∞},
∇bijΦ(b) = −
1
ρi
log aij − ρi − 1
ρi
(log bij + 1) + log pj(b) +
∑
h
bhj
1
pj(b)
=
1
ρi
(
1− log aijb
ρi−1
ij
[pj(b)]ρi
)
;
for those i for which ρi = −∞,
∇bijΦ(b) = − log
bij
cijpj(b)
;
and for those i for which ρi = 0,
∇bijΦ(b) = 1 + log pj(b).
Then, we can deduce that
Φ(b)− Φ(b′)− 〈∇Φ(b′),b− b′〉 = −
∑
i:ρi 6={0,−∞}
ρi − 1
ρi
KL(bi||b′i)−
∑
i:ρi=−∞
KL(bi||b′i) + KL(p||p′)
=
∑
i:ρi 6={0,−∞}
1
ρi
KL(bi||b′i) +
∑
i:ρi=0
KL(bi||b′i)
−
(∑
i
KL(bi||b′i)−KL(p||p′)
)
.
Since
∑
iKL(bi||b′i) ≥ KL(p||p′),∑
i:ρi 6={0,−∞}
1− ρi
ρi
KL(bi||b′i)−
∑
i:ρi=−∞
KL(bi||b′i)
≤ Φ(b)− Φ(b′)− 〈∇Φ(b′),b− b′〉
≤
∑
i:ρi 6={0,−∞}
1
ρi
KL(bi||b′i) +
∑
i:ρi=0
KL(bi||b′i). (16)
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A.2 Proportional Response in the Substitutes Domain with Cobb-Douglas Util-
ity Functions
As in the analysis of Proportional Response in the substitutes domain without Cobb-Douglas utility
functions, the following lemma states the equivalence between mirror descent and Proportional
Response in the substitutes domain; it follows readily from the definition of bt+1 for Proportional
Response (given by (2)).
Lemma A.1. For buyers with strict CES substitutes utilities (ρi > 0), the Proportional Response
update is the same as the mirror descent update, given by:
bt+1i = argminbi:
∑
j bij=ei
{〈∇biΦ(bt),bi − bti〉+
1
ρi
KL(bi||bti)}.
With a simple calculation, one can show the following properties:
1. bt=0 will be equal to b
∗
=0 for t > 0, which, for ρi = 0 and t > 0, implies that:
KL(b∗i ||bti) = 0; (17)
2. b>0 is the spending at the market equilibrium if and only if b>0 is the minimum point of
Φ(·,b∗=0).
We will show the following result.
Theorem A.1.
Φ(bT>0,b
∗
=0)− Φ(b∗>0,b∗=0) ≤
1
T
( ∑
i:ρi>0
1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||b0i ) +
∑
i:ρi=0
KL(b∗i ||b0i )
)
.
We first show the following lemma.
Lemma A.2. For t > 0, Φ(bt+1>0 ,b
∗
=0) ≤ Φ(bt>0,b∗=0).
Proof. By Lemma A.1, we know that for those i for which ρi > 0,
bt+1i = argminbi:
∑
j bij=ei
{
〈∇biΦ(bt),bi − bti〉+
1
ρi
KL(bi||bti)
}
.
Therefore, by Lemma 5.1 with x+ = bt+1>0 , x = b
t
>0, and y = b
t
>0,
〈∇b>0Φ(bt>0,bt=0),bt+1>0 − bt>0〉+
∑
i:ρi>0
1
ρi
KL(bt+1i ||bti)
≤ 〈∇b>0Φ(bt>0,bt=0),bt>0 − bt>0〉+
∑
i:ρi>0
1
ρi
KL(bti||bti)−
∑
i:ρi>0
1
ρi
KL(bti||bt+1i ) ≤ 0.
Also, we know that for t > 0, bt=0 = b
∗
=0. Then, for t > 0:
〈∇Φ(bt>0,b∗=0), (bt+1>0 ,b∗=0)− (bt>0,b∗=0)〉+
∑
i:ρi>0
1
ρi
KL(bt+1i ||bti) ≤ 0.
Applying (16) with b = (bt+1>0 ,b
∗
=0) and b
′ = (bt>0,b
∗
=0) yields:
Φ(bt+1>0 ,b
∗
=0)− Φ(bt>0,b∗=0) ≤ 0,
which gives the result.
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Proof of Theorem A.1. By Lemma A.1,
bt+1i = argminbi:
∑
j bij=ei
{
〈∇biΦ(bt),bi − bti〉+
1
ρi
KL(bi||bti)
}
.
Then, by Lemma 5.1 with x+ = bt+1>0 , x = b
∗
>0, and y = b
t
>0,
〈∇b>0Φ(bt>0,bt=0),bt+1>0 − bt>0〉+
∑
i:ρi>0
1
ρi
KL(bt+1i ||bti)
≤ 〈∇b>0Φ(bt>0,bt=0),b∗>0 − bt>0〉+
∑
i:ρi>0
1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bti)−
∑
i:ρi>0
1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bt+1i ).
This is equivalent to:
〈∇Φ(bt>0,bt=0), (bt+1>0 ,b∗=0)− (bt>0,bt=0)〉+
∑
i:ρi>0
1
ρi
KL(bt+1i ||bti)︸ ︷︷ ︸
LHS
≤ 〈∇Φ(bt>0,bt=0), (b∗>0,b∗=0)− (bt>0,bt=0)〉+
∑
i:ρi>0
1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bti)−
∑
i:ρi>0
1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bt+1i )︸ ︷︷ ︸
RHS
.
(18)
From the second inequality in (16) with b = (bt+1>0 ,b
∗
=0) and b
′ = (bt>0,b
t
=0), the LHS term is
lower bounded by:
Φ(bt+1>0 ,b
∗
=0)− Φ(bt>0,bt=0)−
∑
i:ρi>0
1
ρi
KL(bt+1i ||bti)−
∑
i:ρi=0
KL(b∗i ||bti) +
∑
i:ρi>0
1
ρi
KL(bt+1i ||bti)
(19)
and from the first inequality with b = (b∗>0,b
∗
=0) and b
′ = (bt>0,b
t
=0), the RHS term is upper
bounded by:
Φ(b∗>0,b
∗
=0)− Φ(bt>0,bt=0)−
∑
i:ρi>0
1− ρi
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bti)︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
+
∑
i:ρi>0
1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bti)−
∑
i:ρi>0
1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bt+1i ).
(20)
As LHS ≤ RHS, and as B is positive, we have:
Φ(bt+1>0 ,b
∗
=0)−
∑
i:ρi=0
KL(b∗i ||bti) ≤ Φ(b∗>0,b∗=0) +
∑
i:ρi>0
1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bti)−
∑
i:ρi>0
1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bt+1i ).
(21)
Summing over t gives:
T−1∑
t=0
(
Φ(bt+1>0 ,b
∗
=0)− Φ(b∗>0,b∗=0)
)
≤
∑
i:ρi>0
1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||b0i ) +
T−1∑
t=0
∑
i:ρi=0
KL(b∗i ||bti)
=
∑
i:ρi>0
1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||b0i ) +
∑
i:ρi=0
KL(b∗i ||b0i ).
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The second equality holds because of (17).
By Lemma A.2,
Φ(bT>0,b
∗
=0)− Φ(b∗>0,b∗=0) ≤
1
T
( ∑
i:ρi>0
1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||b0i ) +
∑
i:ρi=0
KL(b∗i ||b0i )
)
.
Theorem A.2. Suppose there is no buyer with a linear utility function. Let σ =
(
mini:ρi>0
{
1
ρi
})
.
Then,
Φ(bT>0,b
∗
=0)− Φ(b∗>0,b∗=0) ≤
σ − 1
σT − 1
( ∑
i:ρi>0
KL(b∗i ||b0i ) +
∑
i:ρi=0
KL(b∗i ||b0i )
)
.
Proof. If there is no buyer with a linear utility function, then we do not drop B in (20). So, instead
of (21), we have:
Φ(bt+1>0 ,b
∗
=0)−
∑
i:ρi=0
KL(b∗i ||bti)
≤ Φ(b∗>0,b∗=0) +
∑
i:ρi>0
KL(b∗i ||bti)−
∑
i:ρi>0
1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bt+1i ). (22)
Multiplying both sides by
(
mini:ρi>0
{
1
ρi
})t
and summing over all t yields:
T−1∑
t=0
(
min
i:ρi>0
{
1
ρi
})t(
Φ(bt+1>0 ,b
∗
=0)− Φ(b∗>0,b∗=0)
)
≤
∑
i:ρi>0
KL(b∗i ||b0i ) +
∑
i:ρi=0
KL(b∗i ||b0i ).
Recall that σ =
(
mini:ρi>0
{
1
ρi
})
. By Lemma A.2,
Φ(bT>0,b
∗
=0)− Φ(b∗>0,b∗=0) ≤
σ − 1
σT − 1
( ∑
i:ρi>0
KL(b∗i ||b0i ) +
∑
i:ρi=0
KL(b∗i ||b0i )
)
.
A.3 Proportional Response in the Complementary Domain with Cobb-Douglas
Utility Functions
The argument in this case is quite similar to the one in the previous subsection.
First, the following lemma shows the equivalence between mirror descent and Proportional
Response (given by (3)) in the complementary domain.
Lemma A.3. For those complementary buyers such that −∞ < ρi < 0, Proportional Response,
which is the best response in this domain, is equivalent to the mirror descent update, given by:
bt+1i = argminbi:
∑
j bij=ei
{
−〈∇biΦ(bt),bi − bti〉+
ρi − 1
ρi
KL(bi||bti)
}
;
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and for those buyers with Leontief utility functions, Proportional Response, which is also the best
response in this domain, is equivalent to the mirror descent update, given by:
bt+1i = argminbi:
∑
j bij=ei
{−〈∇biΦ(bt),bi − bti〉+KL(bi||bti)} .
We also have the following properties:
1. bt=0 will be equal to b
∗
=0 for t > 0, which, for ρi = 0 and t > 0, implies that:
KL(b∗i ||bti) = 0; (23)
2. b<0 is the spending at the market equilibrium if and only if b<0 is the maximum point of
Φ(·,b∗=0).
We show the following result.
Theorem A.3.
Φ(b∗=0,b
∗
<0)− Φ(b∗=0,bT<0) ≤
1
T
( ∑
i:ρi=0
KL(b∗i ||b0i ) +
∑
i:−∞<ρi<0
ρi − 1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||b0i ) +
∑
i:ρi=−∞
KL(b∗i ||b0i )
)
.
We first show the following lemma.
Lemma A.4. For t > 0, Φ(b∗=0,b
t
<0) ≤ Φ(b∗=0,bt+1<0 ).
Proof. By Lemma A.3, we know that for those i for which −∞ < ρi < 0,
bt+1i = argminbi:
∑
j bij=ei
{
−〈∇biΦ(bt),bi − bti〉+
ρi − 1
ρi
KL(bi||bti)
}
,
and for those i for which ρi = −∞,
bt+1i = argminbi:
∑
j bij=ei
{−〈∇biΦ(bt),bi − bti〉+KL(bi||bti)}.
Therefore, by Lemma 5.1, with x+ = bt+1<0 , x = b
t
<0, and y = b
t
<0,
− 〈∇b<0Φ(bt=0,bt<0),bt+1<0 − bt<0〉+
∑
i:−∞<ρi<0
ρi − 1
ρi
KL(bt+1i ||bti) +
∑
i:ρi=−∞
KL(bt+1i ||bti)
≤ −〈∇b<0Φ(bt=0,bt<0),bt<0 − bt<0〉+
∑
i:−∞<ρi<0
ρi − 1
ρi
KL(bti||bti)−
∑
i:−∞<ρi<0
ρi − 1
ρi
KL(bti||bt+1i )
+
∑
i:ρi=−∞
KL(bti||bti)−
∑
i:ρi=−∞
KL(bti||bt+1i )
≤ 0.
We know that for t > 0, bt=0 = b
∗
=0. Therefore, for t > 0,
− 〈∇Φ(b∗=0,bt<0), (b∗=0,bt+1<0 )− (b∗=0,bt<0)〉+
∑
i:−∞<ρi<0
ρi − 1
ρi
KL(bt+1i ||bti) +
∑
i:ρi=−∞
KL(bt+1i ||bti)
≤ 0.
Using (16) yields:
Φ(b∗=0,b
t
<0)− Φ(b∗=0,bt+1<0 ) ≤ 0.
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Proof of Theorem A.3. First, by Lemma A.3, we know that for those i for which −∞ < ρi < 0,
bt+1i = argminbi:
∑
j bij=ei
{
−〈∇biΦ(bt),bi − bti〉+
ρi − 1
ρi
KL(bi||bti)
}
,
and for those i for which ρi = −∞,
bt+1i = argminbi:
∑
j bij=ei
{−〈∇biΦ(bt),bi − bti〉+KL(bi||bti)},
Therefore, by Lemma 5.1, with x+ = bt+1<0 , x = b
∗
<0, and y = b
t
<0,
− 〈∇b<0Φ(bt=0,bt<0),bt+1<0 − bt<0〉+
∑
i:−∞<ρi<0
ρi − 1
ρi
KL(bt+1i ||bti) +
∑
i:ρi=−∞
KL(bt+1i ||bti)
≤ −〈∇b<0Φ(bt=0,bt<0),b∗<0 − bt<0〉+
∑
i:−∞<ρi<0
ρi − 1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bti)−
∑
i:−∞<ρi<0
ρi − 1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bt+1i )
+
∑
i:ρi=−∞
KL(b∗i ||bti)−
∑
i:ρi=−∞
KL(b∗i ||bt+1i ).
This is equivalent to:
− 〈∇Φ(bt=0,bt<0), (b∗=0,bt+1<0 )− (bt=0,bt<0)〉
+
∑
i:−∞<ρi<0
ρi − 1
ρi
KL(bt+1i ||bti) +
∑
i:ρi=−∞
KL(bt+1i ||bti)︸ ︷︷ ︸
LHS
≤ −〈∇Φ(bt=0,bt<0), (b∗=0,b∗<0)− (bt=0,bt<0)〉
+
∑
i:−∞<ρi<0
ρi − 1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bti)−
∑
i:−∞<ρi<0
ρi − 1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bt+1i )
+
∑
i:ρi=−∞
KL(b∗i ||bti)−
∑
i:ρi=−∞
KL(b∗i ||bt+1i ).︸ ︷︷ ︸
RHS
(24)
From the first inequality in (16), the LHS term is lower bounded by:
− Φ(b∗=0,bt+1<0 ) + Φ(bt=0,bt<0)−
∑
i:−∞<ρi<0
ρi − 1
ρi
KL(bt+1i ||bti)−
∑
i:ρi=−∞
KL(bt+1i ||bti)
+
∑
i:−∞<ρi<0
ρi − 1
ρi
KL(bt+1i ||bti) +
∑
i:ρi=−∞
KL(bt+1i ||bti) (25)
and from the second inequality, the RHS term is upper bounded by:
− Φ(b∗=0,b∗<0) + Φ(bt=0,bt<0) +
∑
i:−∞<ρi<0
1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bti)︸ ︷︷ ︸
D
+
∑
i:ρi=0
KL(b∗i ||bti)
+
∑
i:−∞<ρi<0
ρi − 1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bti)−
∑
i:−∞<ρi<0
ρi − 1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bt+1i )
+
∑
i:ρi=−∞
KL(b∗i ||bti)−
∑
i:ρi=−∞
KL(b∗i ||bt+1i ). (26)
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As LHS ≤ RHS, and as D is negative, we have:
−Φ(b∗=0,bt+1<0 ) ≤ −Φ(b∗=0,b∗<0) +
∑
i:ρi=0
KL(b∗i ||bti)
+
∑
i:−∞<ρi<0
ρi − 1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bti)−
∑
i:−∞<ρi<0
ρi − 1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bt+1i )
+
∑
i:ρi=−∞
KL(b∗i ||bti)−
∑
i:ρi=−∞
KL(b∗i ||bt+1i ). (27)
Summing over all t yields:
T−1∑
t=0
(
Φ(b∗=0,b
∗
<0)− Φ(b∗=0,bt+1<0 )
)
≤
T−1∑
t=0
∑
i:ρi=0
KL(b∗i ||bti) +
∑
i:−∞<ρi<0
ρi − 1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||b0i )
+
∑
i:ρi=−∞
KL(b∗i ||b0i )
≤
∑
i:ρi=0
KL(b∗i ||b0i ) +
∑
i:−∞<ρi<0
ρi − 1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||b0i )
+
∑
i:ρi=−∞
KL(b∗i ||b0i ).
The second inequality holds because of (23).
By Lemma A.4,
Φ(b∗=0,b
∗
<0)− Φ(b∗=0,bT<0) ≤
1
T
( ∑
i:ρi=0
KL(b∗i ||b0i ) +
∑
i:−∞<ρi<0
ρi − 1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||b0i )
+
∑
i:ρi=−∞
KL(b∗i ||b0i )
)
.
Theorem A.4. Suppose there is no buyer with a Leontief utility function. Let σ = mini:ρi<0
{
ρi−1
ρi
}
.
Then:
Φ(b∗=0,b
∗
<0)− Φ(b∗=0,bT<0) ≤
σ − 1
σT − 1
( ∑
i:ρi=0
KL(b∗i ||b0i ) +
∑
i:ρi<0
KL(b∗i ||b0i )
)
.
Proof. If there is no buyer with a Leontief utility function, then we do not dropD in (26). Therefore,
instead of (27), we have:
−Φ(b∗=0,bt+1<0 ) ≤ −Φ(b∗=0,b∗<0) +
∑
i:ρi=0
KL(b∗i ||bti)
+
∑
i:ρi<0
KL(b∗i ||bti)−
∑
i:ρi<0
ρi − 1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bt+1i ). (28)
Recall σ = mini:ρi<0
{
ρi−1
ρi
}
. Then, multiplying both sides by σt and summing over t yields:
T−1∑
t=0
σt
(
Φ(b∗=0,b
∗
<0)− Φ(b∗=0,bt+1<0 )
)
≤
∑
i:ρi=0
KL(b∗i ||b0i ) +
∑
i:ρi<0
KL(b∗i ||b0i ).
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By Lemma A.4,
Φ(b∗=0,b
∗
<0)− Φ(b∗=0,bT<0) ≤
σ − 1
σT − 1
( ∑
i:ρi=0
KL(b∗i ||b0i ) +
∑
i:ρi<0
KL(b∗i ||b0i )
)
.
A.4 Proportional Response with the Entire CES Range
Formally, in this case, Damped Proportional Response is defined as follows:
bt+1ij = ei
[
btij · aij
(
btij
ptj
)ρi] 12
∑
k
[
btik · aik
(
bt
ik
pt
k
)ρi] 12 , for ρi > 0; bt+1ij = ei
[
btij · atij
] 1
2
∑
k
[
btik · atik
] 1
2
, for ρi = 0;
bt+1ij = ei
[
btij ·
(
aij
pt
j
ρi
) 1
1−ρi
] 1
2
∑
k
[
btik ·
(
aik
pt
k
ρi
) 1
1−ρi
] 1
2
, for −∞ < ρi < 0; bt+1ij = ei
[
btij ·
(
cij
pt
j
)−1] 1
2
∑
k
[
btik ·
(
cik
pt
k
)−1]1
2
, for ρi = −∞;
pt+1j =
∑
j
bt+1ij
Similarly to the Cobb-Douglas-free domain, we have the following observations.
Lemma A.5. If ρi > 0 for buyer i, then Damped Proportional Response is equivalent to mirror
descent with a halved step size, defined as follows:
bt+1i = argminbi:
∑
j bij=ei
{
〈∇biΦ(bt),bi − bti〉+
2
ρi
KL(bi||bti)
}
;
if −∞ < ρi < 0 for buyer i, then Damped Proportional Response is equivalent to mirror descent
with a halved step size, defined as follows:
bt+1i = argminbi:
∑
j bij=ei
{
−〈∇biΦ(bt),bi − bti〉+
2(ρi − 1)
ρi
KL(bi||bti)
}
.
and if ρi = −∞ for buyer i, then Damped Proportional Response is equivalent to mirror descent
with a halved step size, defined as follows:
bt+1i = argminbi:
∑
j bij=ei
{−〈∇biΦ(bt),bi − bti〉+ 2KL(bi||bti)}.
Proof. By calculation.
However, we find that for the buyers with Cobb-Douglas utility functions, their updating rule
cannot be written in mirror descent form. Instead, we make a separate argument for these buyers.
Let b∗i be the equilibrium spending of buyer i. If ρi = 0 for buyer i, then her updating rule only
depends on her previous spending and her preferences, and it is independent of the other buyers.
Consequently, as we show in the following lemma, the convergence rate of Damped Proportional
Response for the buyers with Cobb-Douglas utilities will be fast.
30
Lemma A.6. If ρi = 0 for buyer i, then:
KL(b∗i ||b0i ) ≥
T∑
t=1
KL(b∗i ||bti) and KL(b∗i ||bti) ≥ 2KL(b∗i ||bt+1i ).
Proof. First, we want to show that for any buyer i with ρi = 0, Damped Proportional Response is
equivalent to mirror descent on Ψ(bi) = −
∑
j bij log
aij
bij
with halved step size:
bt+1i = argminbi:
∑
j bij=ei
{〈∇Ψ(bti),bi − bti〉+ 2KL(bi||bti)},
Note that
∇bijΨ(bi) = − log
aij
bij
+ 1.
Then, by calculation, bt+1ij = ei
(btij ·aij)
1
2
∑
k(b
t
ik
·aik)
1
2
, which is exactly the Damped Proportional Response
update rule.
Furthermore, it is easy to see that Ψ is a convex function and it satisfies the following equality:
Ψ(bi)−Ψ(b′i)− 〈∇Ψ(b′i),bi − b′i〉 = KL(bi,b′i). (29)
Therefore, setting bi = b
t+1
i and b
′
i = b
t
i gives
Ψ(bt+1i )−Ψ(bti) = 〈∇Ψ(bti),bt+1i − bti〉+ 2KL(bt+1i ||bti)−KL(bt+1i ||bti)
and then by Lemma 5.1 with g(·) = 〈∇Ψ(bti), · − bti〉, x+ = bt+1i , x = b∗i , y = bti, and d(·, ·) =
2KL(·||·):
Ψ(bt+1i )−Ψ(bti) ≤ 〈∇Ψ(bti),b∗i − bti〉+ 2KL(b∗i ||bti)− 2KL(b∗i ||bt+1i )−KL(bt+1i ||bti). (30)
Setting bi = b
∗
i , b
′
i = b
t
i in (29) gives:
Ψ(bti)−Ψ(b∗i ) = −〈∇Ψ(bti),b∗i − bti〉 −KL(b∗i ||bti).
And combining this with (30) gives:
Ψ(bt+1i )−Ψ(b∗i ) ≤ KL(b∗i ||bti)− 2KL(b∗i ||bt+1i ). (31)
Since Ψ(·) is a convex function and b∗i is the minimum point for Ψ, (31) implies:
KL(b∗i ||bti) ≥ 2KL(b∗i ||bt+1i ). (32)
Note this inequality holds for any t ≥ 0. So, for any T ,
KL(b∗i ||b0i ) ≥
T∑
t=1
KL(b∗i ||bti).
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For the next part, recall that b>0, b=0 and b<0 denote the spending of those buyers with ρi > 0,
ρi = 0, and ρi < 0, respectively, and that we rewrote Φ(b) as Φ(b>0,b=0,b<0).
With a simple calculation one can show:
• For fixed b=0 and b<0, Φ(·,b=0,b<0) is a convex function.
• For fixed b>0 and b=0, Φ(b>0,b=0, ·) is a concave function.
• Let b∗>0, b∗=0 and b∗<0 be the market equilibrium of the Fisher market; then
– b∗>0 minimizes Φ(·,b∗=0,b∗<0);
– b∗<0 maximizes Φ(b
∗
>0,b
∗
=0, ·).
Theorem A.5. Damped Proportional Response converges to the equilibrium with a convergence
rate of:
T∑
t=1
[
Φ(bt>0,b
∗
=0,b
∗
<0)− Φ(b∗>0,b∗=0,bt<0)
]
≤ 4
∑
i:ρi=0
KL(b∗i ||b0i ) +
∑
i:−∞<ρi<0
2(ρi − 1)
ρi
KL(b∗i ||b0i )
+
∑
i:ρi>0
2
ρi
KL(b∗i ||b0i ) +
∑
i:ρi=−∞
KL(b∗i ||b0i ).
Proof. First, let’s look at bt>0. By Lemma A.5, we know that for those i for which ρi > 0,
bt+1i = argminbi:
∑
j bij=ei
{
〈∇biΦ(bt),bi − bti〉+
2
ρi
KL(bi||bti)
}
.
Therefore, by Lemma 5.1 with x+ = bt+1>0 , x = b
∗
>0, y = b
t
>0,
〈∇b>0Φ(bt>0,bt=0,bt<0),bt+1>0 − bt>0〉+
∑
i:ρi>0
2
ρi
KL(bt+1i ||bti)
≤ 〈∇b>0Φ(bt>0,bt=0,bt<0),b∗>0 − bt>0〉+
∑
i:ρi>0
2
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bti)−
∑
i:ρi>0
2
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bt+1i ).
This is equivalent to:
〈∇Φ(bt>0,bt=0,bt<0), (bt+1>0 ,b∗=0,bt+1<0 )− (bt>0,bt=0,bt<0)〉+
∑
i:ρi>0
2
ρi
KL(bt+1i ||bti)︸ ︷︷ ︸
LHS
≤ 〈∇Φ(bt>0,bt=0,bt<0), (b∗>0,b∗=0,bt+1<0 )− (bt>0,bt=0,bt<0)〉
+
∑
i:ρi>0
2
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bti)−
∑
i:ρi>0
2
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bt+1i )︸ ︷︷ ︸
RHS
. (33)
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From the second inequality in (16), the LHS term is lower bounded by:
Φ(bt+1>0 ,b
∗
=0,b
t+1
<0 )− Φ(bt>0,bt=0,bt<0)−
∑
i:ρi 6={0,−∞}
1
ρi
KL(bt+1i ||bti)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
−
∑
i:ρi=0
KL(b∗i ||bti) +
∑
i:ρi>0
2
ρi
KL(bt+1i ||bti) (34)
and from the first inequality, the RHS term is upper bounded by:
Φ(b∗>0,b
∗
=0,b
t+1
<0 )− Φ(bt>0,bt=0,bt<0)−
∑
i:ρi>0
1− ρi
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bti)︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
−
∑
i:−∞<ρi<0
1− ρi
ρi
KL(bt+1i ||bti) +
∑
i:ρi=−∞
KL(bt+1i ||bti)
+
∑
i:ρi>0
2
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bti)−
∑
i:ρi>0
2
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bt+1i ). (35)
As LHS ≤ RHS, as the portion of A for ρi < 0 is negative, and as B is positive, we have
Φ(bt+1>0 ,b
∗
=0,b
t+1
<0 ) +
∑
i:ρi>0
1
ρi
KL(bt+1i ||bti)−
∑
i:ρi=0
KL(b∗i ||bti)
≤ Φ(b∗>0,b∗=0,bt+1<0 ) +
∑
i:−∞<ρi<0
ρi − 1
ρi
KL(bt+1i ||bti) +
∑
i:ρi=−∞
KL(bt+1i ||bti)
+
∑
i:ρi>0
2
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bti)−
∑
i:ρi>0
2
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bt+1i ). (36)
Next, let’s look at bt<0. The argument used here is similar to that for b
t
>0. First, by Lemma
A.5, we know that for those i for which −∞ < ρi < 0,
bt+1i = argminbi:
∑
j bij=ei
{
−〈∇biΦ(bt),bi − bti〉+
2(ρi − 1)
ρi
KL(bi||bti)
}
,
and for those i for which ρi = −∞,
bt+1i = argminbi:
∑
j bij=ei
{−〈∇biΦ(bt),bi − bti〉+ 2KL(bi||bti)},
Therefore, by Lemma 5.1,
− 〈∇b<0Φ(bt>0,bt=0,bt<0),bt+1<0 − bt<0〉+
∑
i:−∞<ρi<0
2(ρi − 1)
ρi
KL(bt+1i ||bti) +
∑
i:ρi=−∞
2KL(bt+1i ||bti)
≤ −〈∇b<0Φ(bt>0,bt=0,bt<0),b∗<0 − bt<0〉+
∑
i:−∞<ρi<0
2(ρi − 1)
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bti)
−
∑
i:−∞<ρi<0
2(ρi − 1)
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bt+1i ) +
∑
i:ρi=−∞
2KL(b∗i ||bti)−
∑
i:ρi=−∞
2KL(b∗i ||bt+1i ).
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This is equivalent to:
− 〈∇Φ(bt>0,bt=0,bt<0), (bt+1>0 ,b∗=0,bt+1<0 )− (bt>0,bt=0,bt<0)〉
+
∑
i:−∞<ρi<0
2(ρi − 1)
ρi
KL(bt+1i ||bti) +
∑
i:ρi=−∞
2KL(bt+1i ||bti)︸ ︷︷ ︸
LHS
≤ −〈∇Φ(bt>0,bt=0,bt<0), (bt+1>0 ,b∗=0,b∗<0)− (bt>0,bt=0,bt<0)〉
+
∑
i:−∞<ρi<0
2(ρi − 1)
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bti)−
∑
i:−∞<ρi<0
2(ρi − 1)
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bt+1i )
+
∑
i:ρi=−∞
2KL(b∗i ||bti)−
∑
i:ρi=−∞
2KL(b∗i ||bt+1i ).︸ ︷︷ ︸
RHS
(37)
From the first inequality in (16), the LHS term is lower bounded by:
− Φ(bt+1>0 ,b∗=0,bt+1<0 ) + Φ(bt>0,bt=0,bt<0)−
∑
i:ρi 6={0,−∞}
ρi − 1
ρi
KL(bt+1i ||bti)︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
−
∑
i:ρi=−∞
KL(bt+1i ||bti)
+
∑
i:ρi<0
2(ρi − 1)
ρi
KL(bt+1i ||bti) +
∑
i:ρi=−∞
2KL(bt+1i ||bti) (38)
and from the second inequality, the RHS term is upper bounded by:
− Φ(bt+1>0 ,b∗=0,b∗<0) + Φ(bt>0,bt=0,bt<0) +
∑
i:ρi>0
1
ρi
KL(bt+1i ||bti) +
∑
i:−∞<ρi<0
1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bti)︸ ︷︷ ︸
D
+
∑
i:ρi=0
KL(b∗i ||bti) +
∑
i:−∞<ρi<0
2(ρi − 1)
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bti)−
∑
i:−∞<ρi<0
2(ρi − 1)
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bt+1i )
+
∑
i:ρi=−∞
2KL(b∗i ||bti)−
∑
i:ρi=−∞
2KL(b∗i ||bt+1i ). (39)
As LHS ≤ RHS, as the portion of C for ρi > 0 is negative, and as D is negative, we have:
− Φ(bt+1>0 ,b∗=0,bt+1<0 ) +
∑
i:−∞<ρi<0
ρi − 1
ρi
KL(bt+1i ||bti) +
∑
i:ρi=−∞
KL(bt+1i ||bti)
≤ −Φ(bt+1>0 ,b∗=0,b∗<0) +
∑
i:ρi>0
1
ρi
KL(bt+1i ||bti) +
∑
i:ρi=0
KL(b∗i ||bti)
+
∑
i:−∞<ρi<0
2(ρi − 1)
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bti)−
∑
i:−∞<ρi<0
2(ρi − 1)
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bt+1i )
+
∑
i:ρi=−∞
2KL(b∗i ||bti)−
∑
i:ρi=−∞
2KL(b∗i ||bt+1i ). (40)
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Summing (36) and (40) gives:
Φ(bt+1>0 ,b
∗
=0,b
∗
<0)− Φ(b∗>0,b∗=0,bt+1<0 )
≤ 2
∑
i:ρi=0
KL(b∗i ||bti) +
∑
i:−∞<ρi<0
2(ρi − 1)
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bti)−
∑
i:−∞<ρi<0
2(ρi − 1)
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bt+1i )
+
∑
i:ρi>0
2
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bti)−
∑
i:ρi>0
2
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bt+1i )
+
∑
i:ρi=−∞
2KL(b∗i ||bti)−
∑
i:ρi=−∞
2KL(b∗i ||bt+1i ).
Summing over all t yields:
T−1∑
t=0
Φ(bt+1>0 ,b
∗
=0,b
∗
<0)− Φ(b∗>0,b∗=0,bt+1<0 )
≤ 2
T−1∑
t=0
∑
i:ρi=0
KL(b∗i ||bti) +
∑
i:−∞<ρi<0
2(ρi − 1)
ρi
KL(b∗i ||b0i )
+
∑
i:ρi>0
2
ρi
KL(b∗i ||b0i ) +
∑
i:ρi=−∞
KL(b∗i ||b0i )
≤ 4
∑
i:ρi=0
KL(b∗i ||b0i ) +
∑
i:−∞<ρi<0
2(ρi − 1)
ρi
KL(b∗i ||b0i )
+
∑
i:ρi>0
2
ρi
KL(b∗i ||b0i ) +
∑
i:ρi=−∞
KL(b∗i ||b0i ),
where Lemma A.6 is used in bounding the first sum on the right hand side.
Theorem A.6. Suppose there is no buyer with either a linear utility or a Leontief utility. Let
σ = min
{
min
i:ρi>0
{
2
1 + ρi
}
, min
i:ρi<0
{
2(ρi − 1)
2ρi − 1
}}
(and so 1 < σ < 2);
then Damped Proportional Response converges to the equilibrium with a convergence rate of:
Φ(bT>0,b
∗
=0,b
∗
<0)−Φ(b∗>0,b∗=0,bT<0) ≤
1
σT−1
[
4
2− σ
∑
i:ρi=0
KL(b∗i ||b0i )
+
∑
i:ρi<0
2ρi − 1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||b0i ) +
∑
i:ρi>0
1 + ρi
ρi
KL(b∗i ||b0i )
]
.
Proof. In this case, on combining (34) and (35), (36) is changed to:
Φ(bt+1>0 ,b
∗
=0,b
t+1
<0 ) +
∑
i:ρi>0
1
ρi
KL(bt+1i ||bti)−
∑
i:ρi=0
KL(b∗i ||bti)
≤ Φ(b∗>0,b∗=0,bt+1<0 ) +
∑
i:ρi<0
ρi − 1
ρi
KL(bt+1i ||bti) +
∑
i:ρi>0
1 + ρi
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bti)−
∑
i:ρi>0
2
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bt+1i ).
(41)
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Also, on combining (38) and (39), (40) is changed to:
− Φ(bt+1>0 ,b∗=0,bt+1<0 ) +
∑
i:ρi<0
ρi − 1
ρi
KL(bt+1i ||bti)
≤ −Φ(bt+1>0 ,b∗=0,b∗<0) +
∑
i:ρi>0
1
ρi
KL(bt+1i ||bti) +
∑
i:ρi=0
KL(b∗i ||bti)
+
∑
i:ρi<0
2ρi − 1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bti)−
∑
i:ρi<0
2(ρi − 1)
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bt+1i ). (42)
Combining (41) and (42) yields:
Φ(bt+1>0 ,b
∗
=0,b
∗
<0)− Φ(b∗>0,b∗=0,bt+1<0 ) ≤ 2
∑
i:ρi=0
KL(b∗i ||bti)
+
∑
i:ρi<0
2ρi − 1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bti)−
∑
i:ρi<0
2(ρi − 1)
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bt+1i )
+
∑
i:ρi>0
1 + ρi
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bti)−
∑
i:ρi>0
2
ρi
KL(b∗i ||bt+1i ).
Recall that σ = min
{
mini:ρi>0
{
2
1+ρi
}
, mini:ρi<0
{
2(ρi−1)
2ρi−1
}}
; then,
T−1∑
t=0
σt
(
Φ(bt+1>0 ,b
∗
=0,b
∗
<0)− Φ(b∗>0,b∗=0,bt+1<0 )
)
≤ 2
T−1∑
t=0
∑
i:ρi=0
σt ·KL(b∗i ||bti)
+
∑
i:ρi<0
2ρi − 1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||b0i ) +
∑
i:ρi>0
1 + ρi
ρi
KL(b∗i ||b0i ).
By (32) and 1 < σ < 2,
T−1∑
t=0
σt
(
Φ(bt+1>0 ,b
∗
=0,b
∗
<0)− Φ(b∗>0,b∗=0,bt+1<0 )
)
≤ 4
2− σ
∑
i:ρi=0
KL(b∗i ||b0i )
+
∑
i:ρi<0
2ρi − 1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||b0i ) +
∑
i:ρi>0
1 + ρi
ρi
KL(b∗i ||b0i ).
Therefore,
Φ(bT>0,b
∗
=0,b
∗
<0)− Φ(b∗>0,b∗=0,bT<0) ≤
1
σT−1
[
4
2− σ
∑
i:ρi=0
KL(b∗i ||b0i )
+
∑
i:ρi<0
2ρi − 1
ρi
KL(b∗i ||b0i ) +
∑
i:ρi>0
1 + ρi
ρi
KL(b∗i ||b0i )
]
.
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B Relationship between the Eisenberg-Gale Program and our Po-
tential Function
In this section, we show a relationship between our potential function and the objective functions
in the Eisenberg-Gale convex program and its dual program.
Let ui(xi) be the utility of buyer i when the allocation is xi. Note that ui(xi) = (
∑
j aij · xρiij )
1
ρi
for 1 ≥ ρi > 0 and 0 > ρi > −∞. For ρi = 0, ui(xi) =
∏
j x
aij
ij with
∑
j aij = 1. For ρi = −∞,
ui(xi) = minj
{
xij
cij
}
. Our potential function is:
pj(b) =
∑
ibij ,
Φ(b) = −
∑
i:ρi 6={0,−∞}
1
ρi
∑
j
bij log
aijb
ρi−1
ij
[pj(b)]ρi
−
∑
i:ρi=−∞
∑
j
bij log
bij
cijpj(b)
+
∑
i:ρi=0
∑
j
bij log pj(b).
Recall that the goal is to minimize Φ(b) in the substitutes domain and maximize Φ(b) in the
complementary domain.
The objective function for the Eisenberg-Gale program is:
Ψ(x) =
∑
i
ei log ui(xi).
Recall that the goal is to maximize Ψ(x).
The objective function for the dual of the Eisenberg-Gale convex program is:
Υ(p) = max
x

∑
i
ei log ui(xi) +
∑
j
pj
(
1−
∑
i
xij
) .
Recall that the goal is to minimize Υ(p).
B.1 Substitutes Domain
In the substitutes domain (ρi ≥ 0), let b be the spending of the buyers; recall that it satisfies∑
j bij = ei for all i. We consider the corresponding allocation x(b) and the Eisenberg-Gale
program, in which xij =
bij
pj(b)
and pj(b) =
∑
h bhj. We have the following result.
Theorem B.1.
Ψ(x(b∗>0,b
∗
=0))−Ψ(x(b>0,b∗=0)) ≤ Φ(b>0,b∗=0)− Φ(b∗>0,b∗=0).
Proof. First, as
∑
j bij = ei, using the concavity of the log function yields:
Ψ(x(b)) =
∑
i:ρi>0
ei
ρi
log
(∑
j
aij
( bij
p(b)
)ρi)
+
∑
i:ρi=0
∑
j
eiaij log
bij
p(b)
≥
∑
i:ρi>0
ei
ρi
∑
j
bij
ei
log
aijb
ρi−1
ij ei
(p(b))ρi
+
∑
i:ρi=0
∑
j
eiaij log
bij
p(b)
=
∑
ij:ρi>0
bij
ρi
log
aijb
ρi−1
ij
(p(b))ρi
+
∑
i:ρi>0
ei
ρi
log ei +
∑
i:ρi=0
∑
j
eiaij log
bij
p(b)
.
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Note that if for each i such that ρi > 0, aij
b
ρi−1
ij∑
h b
ρi
hj
are the same for all j with bij > 0, then the
inequality above will become an equality. Also, at the market equilibrium b∗, this condition holds.
Therefore,
Ψ(x(b∗>0,b
∗
=0))−Ψ(x(b>0,b∗=0))
≤
∑
ij:ρi>0
b∗ij
ρi
log
aijb
∗
ij
ρi−1
(p(b∗>0,b
∗
=0))
ρi
+
∑
i:ρi>0
ei
ρi
log ei +
∑
i:ρi=0
∑
j
eiaij log
b∗ij
p(b∗>0,b
∗
=0)
−
∑
ij:ρi>0
bij
ρi
log
aijb
ρi−1
ij
(p(b>0,b∗=0))
ρi
−
∑
i:ρi>0
ei
ρi
log ei −
∑
i:ρi=0
∑
j
eiaij log
b∗ij
p(b>0,b∗=0)
= −Φ(b∗>0,b∗=0) + Φ(b>0,b∗=0).
The last equality follows because b∗ij = eiaij for ρi = 0.
B.2 Complementary Domain
In the complementary domain (ρi ≤ 0), again b satisfies
∑
j bij = ei for all i. Here we consider the
corresponding price p(b) and the dual of the Eisenberg-Gale program, in which pj(b) =
∑
h bhj.
We have the following result.
Theorem B.2.
Υ(p(b∗=0,b<0))−Υ(p(b∗=0,b∗<0)) ≤ Φ(b∗=0,b∗<0)− Φ(b∗=0,b<0).
Proof. In the proof of Lemma 5.1 in [18], it was shown that the maximum point x in Υ(p) satisfies∑
j xijpj = ei for all i. Therefore,
Υ(p) = max
x:∀i(
∑
j xijpj=ei)
∑
i:0>ρi>−∞
ei log
(∑
j
aijx
ρi
ij
) 1
ρi +
∑
i:ρi=−∞
ei log min
j
{xij
cij
}
+
∑
i:ρi=0
∑
j
eiaij log xij +
∑
j
pj −
∑
i
ei.
Let bij = xijpj. Then,
Υ(p) = max
b:∀i(
∑
j bij=ei)
∑
i:0>ρi>−∞
ei log
(∑
j
aij
(bij
pj
)ρi) 1ρi + ∑
i:ρi=−∞
ei log min
{ bij
pjcij
}
+
∑
i:ρi=0
∑
j
eiaij log
bij
pj
+
∑
j
pj −
∑
i
ei.
Let b(p) be the spending that maximizes
∑
i:0>ρi>−∞
ei log
(∑
j aij
(
bij
pj
)ρi) 1ρi+∑i:ρi=−∞ ei log min{ bijpjcij}+
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∑
i:ρi=0
∑
j eiaij log
bij
pj
under the constraint ∀i(∑j bij = ei), so
Υ(p) =
∑
i:0>ρi>−∞
ei log
(∑
j
aij
(bij(p)
pj
)ρi) 1ρi + ∑
i:ρi=−∞
ei logmin
{bij(p)
pjcij
}
+
∑
i:ρi=0
∑
j
eiaij log
bij(p)
pj
+
∑
j
pj −
∑
i
ei
=
∑
i:0>ρi>−∞
ei log
(∑
j
aij
(bij(p)
pj
)ρi) 1ρi + ∑
i:ρi=−∞
ei logmin
{bij(p)
pjcij
}
+
∑
i:ρi=0
∑
j
b∗ij log
b∗ij
pj
+
∑
j
pj −
∑
i
ei. (43)
The second equality holds because, for those buyers with Cobb-Douglas utility functions, their
optimal spending is always equal to b∗ij = eiaij which is independent of the prices. With a simple
calculation, one can show the following:
1. For those i such that 0 > ρi > −∞, aij bij(p)
ρi−1
p
ρi
j
are the same for different j by the definition
of b(p). Therefore,
ei log
(∑
j
aij
(bij(p)
pj
)ρi) 1ρi = ei
ρi
∑
j
bij(p)
ei
log eiaij
bij(p)
ρi−1
pρij
=
1
ρi
∑
j
bij(p) log aij
bij(p)
ρi−1
pρij
+
ei
ρi
log ei. (44)
For those i such that ρi = −∞, bij(p)pjcij are the same for different j again by the definition of
b(p). Therefore,
ei log min
{bij(p)
pjcij
}
=
∑
j
bij(p) log
bij(p)
pjcij
. (45)
2. For those i such that 0 > ρi > −∞, we focus on the function 1ρi bij log aij
b
ρi−1
ij
p
ρi
j
. By calculation,
given p, this function is a convex function. In addition, the minimal point bi of the function
under the constraint
∑
j bij = ei is bi(p). Therefore, combining with (44) yields
ei log
(∑
j
aij
(bij(p)
pj
)ρi) 1ρi ≤ 1
ρi
∑
j
bij log aij
bρi−1ij
pρij
+
ei
ρi
log ei. (46)
The inequality becomes an equality if bi = bi(p).
For those i such that ρi = −∞, we focus on the function
∑
j bij log
bij
pjcij
. Again, given p, this
function is a convex function, and the minimal point bi of the function under the constraint∑
j bij = ei is bi(p). Therefore,
ei log min
{bij(p)
pjcij
}
≤
∑
j
bij log
bij
pjcij
. (47)
Also, the inequality becomes an equality if bi = bi(p).
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Combining (43), (46) and (47)
Υ(p(b∗=0,b<0)) ≤
∑
i:0>ρi>−∞
(
1
ρi
∑
j
bij log aij
bρi−1ij
(pj(b
∗
=0,b<0))
ρi
+
ei
ρi
log ei
)
+
∑
i:ρi=−∞
∑
j
bij log
bij
pj(b∗=0,b<0)cij
+
∑
i:ρi=0
∑
j
b∗ij log
b∗ij
pj(b∗=0,b<0)
+
∑
j
pj(b
∗
=0,b<0)−
∑
i
ei
= −Φ(b∗=0,b<0) +
∑
j
pj(b
∗
=0,b<0) +
∑
i:ρi>−∞
ei
ρi
log ei +
∑
i:ρi=0
∑
j
b∗ij log b
∗
ij −
∑
i
ei.
Since we know b∗ = b(p(b∗=0,b
∗
<0)), this leads to equality in (46) and (47) in this case. Therefore,
Υ(p(b∗=0,b
∗
<0)) =
∑
i:0>ρi>−∞
(
1
ρi
∑
j
bij log aij
bρi−1ij
(pj(b∗=0,b
∗
<0))
ρi
+
ei
ρi
log ei
)
+
∑
i:ρi=−∞
∑
j
bij log
bij
pj(b∗=0,b
∗
<0)cij
+
∑
i:ρi=0
∑
j
b∗ij log
b∗ij
pj(b∗=0,b
∗
<0)
+
∑
j
pj(b
∗
=0,b
∗
<0)−
∑
i
ei
= −Φ(b∗=0,b∗<0) +
∑
j
pj(b
∗
=0,b
∗
<0) +
∑
i:ρi>−∞
ei
ρi
log ei +
∑
i:ρi=0
∑
j
b∗ij log b
∗
ij −
∑
i
ei.
Since
∑
j pj(b
∗
=0,b<0) =
∑
j pj(b
∗
=0,b
∗
<0) =
∑
i ei, the theorem follows.
C Correspondence between Market Equilibrium andMinimal Point,
Maximal Point and Saddle Point
Theorem C.1. The minimal point in the substitutes domain, the maximal point in the comple-
mentary domain, and the saddle point in the mixed case all corresponds to the respective market
equilibria.
Proof. Suppose we have a market equilibrium (b,p). At a market equilibrium, each buyer maxi-
mizes her utility function. With some calculation, we obtain:
• for ρi = 1: bij > 0 only if j maximizes
{
aij
pj
}
;
• for ρi = 0: bij = λiaij;
• for ρi = −∞: bij = λicijpj;
• for other ρi: bij = λiaij
(
bij
pj
)ρi
.
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Also, note that for the function Φ(·), for those i for which ρi 6= {0,−∞},
∇bijΦ(b) = −
1
ρi
log aij − ρi − 1
ρi
(log bij + 1) + log pj(b) +
∑
h
bhj
1
pj(b)
=
1
ρi
(
1− log aijb
ρi−1
ij
[pj(b)]ρi
)
;
and for those i for which ρi = −∞,
∇bijΦ(b) = − log
bij
cijpj(b)
.
Remember that in both case prices are the sum of the spending. So it’s easy to verify that the
optimal condition for Φ(·) will be a market equilibrium, and vice versa. The result follows.
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